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THE PLACE OF LAW IN IVAN ILLICH’S
 
VISION OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
 
BRUCE MILLER* 
INTRODUCTION: WHY ILLICH NOW? 
In the spring of 2011, when this conference on the thought of 
Ivan Illich was convened, the New Deal consensus in American 
politics seemed finally to be played out.  Its apparent atrophy had 
been a long time coming.  Beginning with the electoral triumph of 
Ronald Reagan in 1980, and perhaps sooner, anti-liberal politicians 
had successfully appealed to the American electorate with increas­
ingly forceful attacks on the reformist ideology fashioned during 
the long presidency of Franklin Roosevelt.  This ideology was ad­
hered to by Roosevelt’s Democratic successors, and would be suc­
cessors, through the administrations of John Kennedy and of 
Lyndon Johnson and the candidacy of Hubert Humphrey.1 
At first, these attacks were mainly indirect. For example, Pres­
ident Reagan, despite his pithy and memorable criticism of the ca­
pacity of government, especially the national government, to 
improve American domestic life (“[G]overnment is not the solution 
to our problem[s]; government is the problem[,]”)2 took care never 
to urge the dismantling of the specific institutional achievements of 
New Deal liberalism.3  If he was more than adept at using the infa­
* Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law. Thanks to 
Jennifer Levi and the members of the Illich Reading Group for organizing this Confer­
ence and Symposium; to Raquel Babeu, J.D. Western New England University 2012, 
for exceptional research help; to the editors and staff of the Western New England Law 
Review for expert editing; and to Marcella Haynes for patience and painstaking produc­
tion help far beyond the call of duty. 
1. See generally THOMAS  FRANK, PITY THE  BILLIONAIRE: THE  HARD-TIMES 
SWINDLE AND THE  UNLIKELY  COMEBACK OF THE  RIGHT (2012); TONY  JUDT, ILL 
FARES THE LAND (2010); JEFF MADRICK, AGE OF GREED: THE TRIUMPH OF FINANCE 
AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICA, 1970 TO THE PRESENT (2011). 
2. Inaugural Address, January 20, 1981, RONALD  REAGAN  PRESIDENTIAL  LI­
BRARY, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/12081a.htm (last visited 
May 24, 2012). 
3. See Mark W. Peacock, Ronald Reagan Quotes on Government and Liberty, 
APPALACHIAN CONSERVATIVE (Apr. 4, 2009, 8:45 AM), http://appalachianconservative. 
wordpress.com/2009/04/04/ronald-reagan-quotes-on-government-and-liberty/ (provid­
ing a list of famous Reagan quotations). 
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508 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:507 
mous welfare queen caricature to stoke the outrage of those who 
would now be called his base,4 Reagan was quick to reassure that 
same base of his firm commitment to the preservation of the social 
safety net, and especially of Social Security and Medicare, the pil­
lars that held that net aloft.5  Similarly, although President Reagan 
also successfully promoted significant deregulation of the banking 
industry,6 the safeguards offered by public insurance agencies es­
tablished during the New Deal protected depositors, with his bless­
ing, from losses caused by the resulting scandals and excesses.7 
President Reagan is further often credited (or blamed) for trig­
gering the now three-decade decline in the power and rights of or­
ganized labor, because of the exemplary force of his decision to end 
the strike of unionized air traffic controllers that greeted his inaugu­
ration by terminating the strikers.8  Nevertheless, though willing to 
act forcefully against the interests of labor, Reagan never criticized 
the legal foundations of collective bargaining enacted by the Wag­
ner Act, and often spoke with pride of his own background as a 
union leader.9  And, while publicly espousing the virtues of “sup­
ply-side” economic policies and Laffer curve-inspired tax cuts for 
the investing and managing classes,10 President Reagan did not 
hesitate to adopt expansionary fiscal policies (albeit chiefly in the 
form of deficit spending on military budgets) as an antidote to the 
deep 1982 recession that threatened his prospects for re-election.11 
By 2011, things were very different.  Most Republican mem­
bers of Congress had pledged never to permit an increase in federal 
4. See Paul Krugman, Republicans and Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/opinion/19krugman.html?scp=17&sq=&st=nyt. 
5. See id. See generally BRUCE SCHULMAN, THE SEVENTIES 218-52 (2011). 
6. SCHULMAN, supra note 5, at 231-32. 
7. See generally Michael P. Malloy, Foreword: . . . And Backward: Death and 
Transfiguration Among the Savings Associations, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S1 (1991). 
8. SCHULMAN, supra note 5, at 233. See generally THOMAS  FERGUSON & JOEL 
ROGERS, RIGHT TURN: THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATS AND THE FUTURE OF AMER­
ICAN POLITICS (1986). 
9. Joseph A. McCartin, Op-Ed., The Strike that Busted Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
2, 2011, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/03/opinion/reagan-vs­
patco-the-strike-that-busted-unions.html?scp=1&sq=&st=nyt. 
10. See generally BRUCE R. BARTLETT, REAGONOMICS: SUPPLY SIDE ECONOMICS 
IN ACTION (1982) (providing a background and history of the Laffer Curve). 
11. See generally LYNN TURGEON, BASTARD KEYNESIANISM: THE EVOLUTION OF 
ECONOMIC THINKING AND POLICYMAKING SINCE WORLD WAR II (1997); Leonard Silk, 
Economic Scene; Is Reagan a Keynesian?, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1985, § D, at 2, availa­
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/19/business/economic-scene-is-reagan-a-keyne­
sian.html. 
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taxes on the wealthy, no matter the consequence.12  In August, they 
showed themselves willing, even anxious, to enforce this pledge 
even if the U.S. Treasury defaulted for the first time on its obliga­
tions to creditors as a result.13  In the aftermath of the 2008 finan­
cial collapse and resulting panic, the federal government quickly 
socialized much of the resulting loss to capital with massive infu­
sions of public funds to many of the very institutions whose policies 
produced the crisis.14  But notwithstanding widespread consensus 
among economists that these policies could never have been imple­
mented but for the gradual demise of the banking and investment 
regulatory structure established by the New Deal,15 Congress re­
mained unwilling to restore much, if any, of that structure.16  Many 
economists and fiscal experts thus believed that the practices and 
relationships which issued in the 2008 collapse remained largely in­
tact and that another, similar crisis was likely to occur in the fore­
seeable future.17 
The 2008 panic spawned a deep and ruinous recession, the 
worst since the Great Depression that ushered in Franklin 
Roosevelt’s presidency.18  But despite the presumed (since the New 
Deal) efficacy of aggressive, counter-cyclical, Keynesian fiscal poli­
cies in countering the widespread unemployment the recession 
caused,19 President Obama proposed only very modest economic 
12. Charles Postel, Why Norquist’s Pledge is Different, POLITICO (Dec. 8, 2011, 
9:33 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1211/70111.html. 
13. Charles Babington, Norquist Bullies GOP into No-Win Tax Position, FISCAL 
TIMES (July 3, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/07/03/AP-Norquist­
Bullies-GOP-into-No-Win-Tax-Position.aspx#page1. 
14. David M. Herszenhorn, Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow Tighter 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/04/ 
business/economy/04bailout.html. 
15. Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
25, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/business/economy/26in­
quiry.html?scp=2&sq=&st=nyt. 
16. Cyrus Sanati, 10 Years Later, Looking at Repeal of Glass-Steagall, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 12, 2009, 2:24 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/10-years-later-look­
ing-at-repeal-of-glass-steagall/. 
17. Hal Scott, Little to Celebrate on Dodd-Frank’s Birthday, FINANCIAL  TIMES 
(July 19, 2011,11:45 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7fcc735e-b257-11e0-8784-00144fea 
bdc0.html. 
18. Bob Willis, U.S. Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2009, 12:00 EDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&sid=aNivTjr852TI. 
19. Ezra Klein, Paul Krugman vs. the White House: Stimulus Edition, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 21, 2011, 4:11 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/ 
paul-krugman-vs-the-white-house-stimulus-edition/2011/08/25/gIQAQ5gt9O_blog.html; 
Paul Krugman, The Obama-Keynes Mystery, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2011, 12:15 PM), http:/ 
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stimulus measures, which were trimmed further by a skeptical Con­
gress.20  By the time of the Illich conference, Congress and the Pres­
ident seemed unable to envision what role, if any, the federal 
government might play in increasing economic demand or promot­
ing employment.  Instead their attention had turned to the nation’s 
long-term fiscal deficit.21  And despite the clarity with which recent 
increases in this deficit could be traced to the nation’s decisions to 
embark on two expensive overseas wars22 and simultaneously to 
adopt, then reinstate, significant cuts in federal income tax rates,23 
the focus of their fiscal concern was largely on the so-called entitle­
ment programs—Medicare, Medicaid, and even the crown jewel of 
New Deal reform, Social Security.24  By the late summer of 2011, 
one Republican candidate to oppose President Obama’s 2012 re­
election bid described Social Security as a “Ponzi scheme” based on 
a “monstrous lie,” and seemed to call for its abolition.25 
The legal underpinnings of collective bargaining were also 
under siege by the time of the Illich Conference.  President 
Obama’s fainthearted proposal to strengthen organizing rights for a 
much diminished private sector labor movement had died a quick 
and mostly silent death in a hostile Congress.26 ector unions, whose 
membership ranks remained relatively robust in relation to their 
/krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/06/the-obama-keynes-mystery/. See generally 
PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 
(2008). 
20. David M. Herszenhorn & Carl Hulse, Deal Reached in Congress on $789 Bil­
lion Stimulus Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2009/02/12/us/politics/12stimulus.html. 
21. Jackie Calmes, Obama’s Budget Focuses on Path to Rein in Deficit, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/us/politics/ 
15obama.html?pagewanted=all; Carl Hulse, House Republicans Propose $4 Trillion in 
Cuts Over Decade, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2011, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2011/04/04/us/politics/04spend.html. 
22. Teresa Tritch, Op-Ed., How the Deficit Got This Big, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 
2011, at SR11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/opinion/sunday/24sun4. 
html. 
23. See id. 
24. See Michael A. Memoli, Lisa Mascaro & Christi Parsons, Obama Again 
Presses for a ‘Grand Bargain’ on Debt Ceiling, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2011, http://articles. 
latimes.com/2011/jul/21/nation/la-na-debt-white-house-20110721. 
25. Rachel Weiner, Rick Perry Repeats Social Security is ‘Ponzi Scheme’ State­
ment, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2011, 9:01 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the­
fix/post/rick-perry-and-mitt-romney-come-out-swinging-in-reagan-debate/2011/09/07/gI 
QAhygcAK_blog.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
26. See Steven Greenhouse, Democrats Drop Key Part of Bill to Assist Unions, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/busi­
ness/17union.html. 
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private sector counterparts,27 found themselves under ferocious po­
litical attack.  Many politicians blamed the bargaining rights of 
teachers’ unions for the problems plaguing the education of poor 
children.28  State governors, most notoriously in Wisconsin29 but 
also in other states,30 successfully urged the repeal of collective bar­
gaining rights for most public sector workers.  And state and local 
government employee retirement pensions that were the frequent 
fruit of the exercise of these rights seemed in many places to be ripe 
for repudiation, with apparent public acquiescence.31 
Worst of all, the achievements of the New Deal seem to be 
going down without a fight. Formerly self-identified liberal politi­
cians ran from the label.32  More fundamentally, they were unwill­
ing or unable to offer a coherent ideological defense of liberal 
reform.33  As a consequence, an ever more confident and deter­
mined conservative assault on the programs and institutions created 
by the New Deal seemed immune from either theoretical or practi­
cal challenge. 
But if the ideology that supported the New Deal was in tatters 
and its accomplishments in apparent disarray, for many Americans 
the reform impulse nevertheless burned brightly. The enthusiasm 
of the Occupy Wall Street Movement that was germinating as the 
Illich Conference convened provided strong evidence of its persis­
27. Robert Reich, The Shameful Attack on Public Employees, HUFFINGTON POST, 
(Jan. 5, 2011, 9:14 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/the-shameful-at­
tack-on-pu_b_805050.html. 
28. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Bipartisan, But Unfounded: The Assault on Teachers’ 
Unions, AM. EDUCATOR (Winter 2011-2012), at 14, available at http://www.aft.org/pdfs/ 
americaneducator/winter1112/Kahlenberg.pdf; Saul Rubinstein, Charles Heckscher & 
Paul Adler, Op-Ed., Moving Beyond ‘Blame the Teacher’, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/16/opinion/la-oe-adler-teachers-20110916. 
29. Monica Davey, Wisconsin Court Reinstates Law on Union Rights, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 14, 2011, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/us/politics/15wis­
consin.html. 
30. Sabrina Tavernise & Steven Greenhouse, Ohio Vote on Labor is Parsed for 
Omens, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/us/ 
politics/ohio-vote-on-collective-bargaining-is-parsed-for-2012-omens.html. 
31. Korey Clark, Pension Peril, XVIV, No.2 ST. NET CAPITOL J. 1, 1-5 (Jan. 17, 
2011), available at www.statenet.com/capitol_journal/01-17-2011/pdf. 
32. See Defining Liberals, PBS (July 23, 2004), http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/ 
liberalism.html; Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The Conscience of a Liberal: Ted Kennedy, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2009, 9:54 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/ted­
kennedy/. 
33. FRANK, supra note 1. 
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512 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:507 
tence.34  And in the face of political defeat and ideological surren­
der, it made sense to wonder if this impulse might draw succor, or 
even inspiration, from reform traditions different from, and per­
haps, even in tension with New Deal liberalism. When the ideology 
of the New Deal was at its political apex during the administrations 
of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and well before the current 
conservative counter-revolution had begun to gain momentum, a 
small group of American thinkers offered a distinct alternative to 
liberal social reform.  This alternative, though not Marxist and per­
haps not even situated to the left of liberalism, was nevertheless 
radical in that it rejected the concentration not only of corporate 
power, but also of the power of the national government on which 
the New Deal relied. 
I. SITUATING IVAN ILLICH 
Ivan Illich was one of those thinkers. Born in Vienna in the 
mid 1920s to a family of mixed ethnicity and religious back­
grounds,35 Illich trained to be a Roman Catholic parish priest.36  He 
served in that role in Washington Heights, Manhattan, then a very 
poor community of recent, chiefly Puerto Rican, immigrants.37  The 
Church subsequently assigned Illich to Puerto Rico,38 where he first 
ran a language school for priests and then served as an administra­
tor of the Catholic University.39  Dismissed from the university post 
after expressing opposition to the church’s position on contracep­
tion,40 Illich settled in Cuernavaca, Mexico, where, in 1964, he es­
tablished the language school he was to operate until 1976,41 and 
began to write essays of political and social criticism.42 
Illich’s mature political thought emerged in the midst of the 
struggle to achieve basic civil rights for African Americans and just 
as the student movement that became the New Left was getting 
34. See Mattathias Schwartz, Pre-Occupied: The Origins and Future of Occupy 
Wall Street, THE  NEW  YORKER (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/ 
2011/11/28/111128fa_fact_schwartz. 
35. Carl Mitcham, The Challenges of This Collection, in THE  CHALLENGES OF 
IVAN ILLICH 9, 9 (Lee Hoinacki & Carl Mitcham eds., 2002). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Chase Madar, The People’s Priest, THE  AM. CONSERVATIVE, Feb. 1, 2010, 
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/article/2010/feb/01/00024/. 
41. Mitcham, supra note 35 
42. Mitcham, supra note 35, at 9-10. 
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underway in the United States.  Though his published work ac­
knowledges no direct influence from either of these sources, Illich’s 
critique of both industrial capitalism and the then hegemonic ideol­
ogy of the New Deal articulated many of the ideas that shaped 
these movements of the 1960s.43 
Along with such contemporaries as Paul Goodman,44 Karl 
Hess,45 Jane Jacobs,46 Christopher Lasch,47 Robert Parris Moses,48 
and Charles Reich,49 Illich offered a direction for social reform that 
rejected the then-reigning oppositions between market ordering 
and traditional social values, represented by the Republican Party, 
and the New Deal commitment to government-led economic and 
social progress generally associated with the Democrats.  Instead, 
Illich and his cohort claimed to identify a different set of opposi­
tions, which, they argued, showed the failure of modern industrial 
society, in either its conservative or liberal iterations, to serve the 
most basic human needs.  If the contemporary American political 
economy offered the prospect of freedom from material want, it did 
so only by holding out a fundamentally alienating consumer iden­
tity as its alternative.50  If technological advances promised an end 
43. See IVAN  ILLICH, TOOLS FOR  CONVIVIALITY 10-11, 91-92 (Harper & Row 
1973) [hereinafter ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY]. 
44. See generally PAUL  GOODMAN, COMPULSORY  MIS-EDUCATION (1964) (criti­
cizing the impact of corporate culture on youth); PAUL GOODMAN, GROWING UP AB­
SURD: PROBLEMS OF  YOUTH IN THE  ORGANIZED  SYSTEM (5th prtg. 1960); PAUL 
GOODMAN, NEW  REFORMATION: NOTES OF A  NEOLITHIC  CONSERVATIVE (1970) (ex­
ploring the dehumanizing impact of technology); PAUL  GOODMAN, THE  COMMUNITY 
OF SCHOLARS (1962) (providing an anarchist perspective on educational theory). 
45. See generally KARL  HESS, DEAR  AMERICA (1975) (providing an autobio­
graphical account of moving away from conservatism toward participatory democracy). 
46. See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CIT­
IES (1961) (portraying and celebrating the diversity and self sufficiency of community 
life in various American cities). 
47. See generally CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD (1975) 
(discussing how the professionalization of human services has led to a decline in the 
integrity and competency of families); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCIS­
SISM (1979) (exploring narcissism from various social perspectives and lamenting its 
impact on political participation). 
48. See generally  ERIC BURNER, AND GENTLY HE SHALL LEAD THEM: ROBERT 
PARRIS MOSES AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI (1994) (providing a biographical de­
piction of the ideology of Robert Moses); THE ALGEBRA PROJECT, http://www.algebra. 
org/history.php (last visited May 24, 2012) (outlining an organization committed to 
school reform founded by Robert Moses). 
49. See generally CHARLES A. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970) (argu­
ing for a new, more participatory, form of politics based on a counter-cultural con­
sciousness (Consciousness III) which rejects both traditional conservatism 
(Consciousness I) and New Deal liberalism (Consciousness II)). 
50. See ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY, supra note 43, at 10-11, 91. 
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to drudgery, the price was a growing physical and spiritual distance 
between workers and the work they did.51  Though experts might 
point the way towards a more efficient use of economic resources 
and more harmonious social, even family, relations, increasing reli­
ance on expertise undermined both popular democracy and the 
competence of ordinary people to solve their own problems.52  And 
if the centralized administrative state ushered in by the New Deal 
served as a counterweight to concentrated corporate power, it nev­
ertheless imposed its own set of hierarchical relationships that sup­
planted more participatory forms of political and economic 
decision-making.53 
Ivan Illich’s particular elaboration of this critique is developed 
most fully in a very short book, Tools for Conviviality, published in 
1973.54  Illich’s primary aim in Tools was to issue a jeremiad calling 
for an end to the industrial age and its modes of production.55  Il­
lich’s targets were development (especially large-scale industrial 
and agricultural development), technology, and the exploitation of 
nature.56  In some cases, his attack anticipated the argument of 
some current radical environmental activists that the abundant liv­
ing standards achieved in first world countries during the 20th cen­
tury must be jettisoned, on the ground that they are incompatible 
with the survival of the earth’s atmosphere, and thus, of its inhabi­
tants.57  But Illich’s objection to industrial society was focused less 
on its threat to biological sustainability than on its destruction of 
healthy social relationships and, perhaps, the very possibility of 
human flourishing.58 
Drawing from his studies of the health care industry,59 public 
education,60 and public transportation systems,61 Illich, in Tools, ar­
gued that the organizational structures created by these and other 
51. Id. at 91, 96-97. 
52. Id. at 91. 
53. Id. 
54. See generally id. 
55. Id. at IX-XII. 
56. Id. at 91. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
59. See generally IVAN ILLICH, LIMITS TO MEDICINE: MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE EX­
PROPRIATION OF  HEALTH (Marion Boyars 2002) (1975) (discussing why modern 
medicine has not had positive effects on health). 
60. See generally IVAN ILLICH, DESCHOOLING SOCIETY (Ruth Nanda Anshen ed., 
Harper & Row 1971) (criticizing the hierarchical and bureaucratic organization of 
schools and arguing for the recognition of the competency and natural curiosity of stu­
dents as central educational values). 
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economic institutions characteristic of the developed world are both 
counterproductive and inimical to the natural “conviviality” of the 
human spirit.62  His assault on these structures was as comprehen­
sive as it was fundamental.  Illich’s central claim was that they 
transferred power from independent people to anonymous bureau­
cracies.63  More specifically, they protected formal, hierarchical ed­
ucational arrangements at the expense of actual learning;64 
exploited nature rather than recognizing its preservation as a “con­
vivial” value;65 created material abundance while undermining the 
possibility of meaning in ordinary life;66 fostered social mobility at 
the expense of personal security and a sense of place;67 and, finally, 
insisted on perpetual innovation at a pace which precludes the sus­
tenance of an organic tradition.68  Above all, Illich insisted that pre­
vailing corporate forms of industrial production degrade social 
relations, monopolize imagination and motivation, and eventually 
commodify every aspect of human life.69 
Against this dispiriting picture, Illich urged what he called the 
“inversion” of the social arrangements and institutions of industrial 
society.70  By this, he meant a political process by which people be­
come enlightened about the necessity to opt for a more “frugal” 
standard of living, enter into social movements aimed at reclaiming 
more convivial ways of life, and, finally, rediscover and revalue the 
political and legal tools that can help establish and protect these 
convivial life forms as they emerge.71 
II. THE ROLE OF LAW IN ILLICH’S PROPOSED
 
POLITICAL INVERSION
 
Illich’s identification of the convivial tools that might help 
bring about the inversion of industrial society strove for a consis­
tency between ends and means.72  He sought to reclaim, or, as he 
61. See generally IVAN D. ILLICH, ENERGY AND EQUITY (Calder & Boyars 1974) 
(discussing how political control of energy leads to social injustice). 
62. See  ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY, supra note 43, at 91. 
63. Id. at 91. 
64. Id. at 61-73. 
65. Id. at 51-54. 
66. Id. at 54-61. 
67. Id. at 73-79. 
68. Id. at 79-82. 
69. Id. at 91. 
70. Id. at 108. 
71. Id. at 108-09. 
72. Id. at 91-92. 
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put it, to recover, three key cultural institutions: science,73 lan­
guage,74 and law.75  Illich argued that the ways in which these insti­
tutions approach and apprehend the world can not only generate 
new social structures, but, just as importantly, can do so using 
means that are themselves examples of the more convivial forms of 
life these new structures encourage.76 
The rule of law, through both the habits of thought it relies on 
and its central institutional invention—formal adjudication—lay at 
the heart of Illich’s vision of social change.77  For Illich, law’s radical 
potential was a function of its blend of procedural formality and 
substantive openness.78  The formal equality of adjudication under 
the adversary system meant that every argument, every idea, no 
matter how apparently novel or even subversive, had to be evalu­
ated exclusively on its own merits, rather than filtered through leg­
islative processes controlled by corporations or the bureaucratic 
imperatives of administrative agencies.79  The commitment of adju­
dication to offer “disinterested” tribunals, staffed by judges without 
pre-conceived commitments to particular substantive outcomes, re­
inforced this formal equality by neutralizing the capacity of corpo­
rations and governments to dominate individuals and communities 
through the sheer force of their vastly greater resources.80 
For Illich, the equality assured by its procedural formality was 
augmented by the inherent substantive openness of adjudication. 
Illich’s argument here began, perhaps paradoxically, by assuming 
the validity of the traditional distinction between the creation of 
legal norms and their subsequent application by judges.81  For Illich, 
adjudication was essentially a backward looking process, which 
draws on already established sources of law to justify the outcomes 
it reaches in particular cases.82  This reliance on past value judg­
ments is its greatest strength.  In celebrating it, Illich at first glance 
seemed to ally himself with the well-known conservative critique of 
“judicial activism,” defined by its critics as the illegitimate creation 
73. Id. at 92-95. 
74. Id. at 95-99. 
75. Id. at 99-107. 
76. Id. at 91-92. 
77. Id. at 91, 99-107. 
78. Id. at 99-107. 
79. Id. at 101. 
80. Id. at 104. 
81. Id. at 101-02. 
82. Id. at 102. 
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of law by reform minded judges.83  And Illich did unquestionably 
locate the legitimacy of adjudication in its separation of the process 
from the substance of law, attainable only through the rigorously 
formal application of pre-existing legal values by dispassionate, dis­
interested tribunals.84 
This separation did more than just underwrite the legitimacy of 
adjudication.  It also assured the continuity of the content of the 
substantive law applied by judges.85  Here again, Illich appeared to 
embrace another tenet of conservative legal thought, that the grad­
ual, glacially accreting development of law that inheres in case-by­
case adjudication guarantees its stability, predictability, and, most 
important, its accessibility and visibility to the polity it serves.86 
Characteristically though, Illich derived radical potential from 
his conservative account of the rule of law. The stability of law con­
ferred by adjudication was, for Illich, not the same as stasis.  Indeed 
the two were antithetical.  The continuity of legal norms allows, 
even obligates, the participants in adjudication—the parties, the 
lawyers, the judges—constantly to adapt these norms, or what Illich 
called the “social experience” of our legal forebears, to our deepest 
present controversies.87  This wholly conventional application of es­
tablished legal values to contemporary disputes entails the radical 
(if gradual) malleability of the content of the particular legal doc­
trines enforced by judges at any given time. 
In Illich’s view, the opportunity provided by adjudication to 
reassess present legal doctrines in light of past values precluded, by 
definition, the final settlement of any controversy over a matter of 
public concern.88  Every basic question of political and social organ­
ization could be framed as a question of law and tested through the 
crucible of adversarial adjudication.89  And given the formal com­
mitment of the adjudicative process to openness, substantive disin­
terestedness, and equal respect for all parties, even the most 
fundamental challenges to current social arrangements had to be 
taken seriously, and could never be summarily dismissed because of 
the relative powerlessness of their proponents.90  Thus were the 
83. See id. at 102-07. 
84. Id. at 104. 
85. Id. at 102. 
86. Id. at 102-03. 
87. Id. at 103. 
88. Id. at 103-04. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 104. 
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tools for radical social change embedded in the conventional appli­
cation of settled legal principles to the changed (and dismal) condi­
tions that were the object of Illich’s social criticism. 
III. ILLICH’S DOUBTS ABOUT LAW 
If Illich was optimistic about the law’s role in generating social 
change, he was not naı̈ve.  Even as he hoped for law’s “inversion­
ary” potential, he saw many obstacles to the realization of that 
hope.91  Foremost among these was the distance Illich observed be­
tween the ideal form of adjudication that grounded his cautious op­
timism and the actual courts he saw operating in the United 
States.92  The latter were staffed by judges who were anything but 
the disinterested servants of the openness to argument, equal re­
spect for all parties, and “due procedure” that Illich saw as essential 
to the transformation of substantive legal doctrines.93  Instead, 
judges were mostly ideologues, shaped by and devoted to the pres­
ervation of the social structures that produced and elevated them.94 
In late 20th century America, this meant that nearly all judges were 
reflexively oriented towards corporate power and the promotion of 
limitless economic growth.95  The content of the substantive doc­
trines articulated and defended in the decisions handed down by 
these judges would inevitably embody this outlook and would, ac­
cordingly, most often reinforce existing class structures, social hier­
archies, and ethical norms. 
The ideological hostility of judges was not the only impediment 
Illich saw to the strategic use of adjudication to achieve legal and 
social change.96  Beyond the limits imposed by their substantive ori­
entation, judges were also distracted from serious consideration of 
cases raising challenges to social structures or to the distribution of 
power by the day-to-day demands of their position.97  Most ordi­
nary civil litigation, Illich believed, probably rightly, involved rela­
tively prosaic struggles over distribution of the material proceeds of 
the existing system.98  The channeling of these disputes into the for­
mal adversarial process of adjudication misused this process in 
91. Id. at 101. 
92. Id. at 101-02. 
93. Id. at 102. 
94. Id. at 104. 
95. Id. at 104. 
96. Id. at 101-02, 104. 
97. Id. at 102, 104. 
98. Id. at 99-100. 
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three important ways.  First, most individual and even group con­
flicts did not require adversarial adjudication in order to be re­
solved justly and accurately.99  Especially when the disputants were 
relatively equal in resources, more informal methods of conflict res­
olution could produce faster, cheaper, and probably better out­
comes.100  Second, the resort to formal adjudication for matters 
where it was unnecessary risked pointless escalation of conflict, 
made the disputants dependent on lawyers and other experts in­
stead of their own judgment, and interposed an alienated distance 
between the disputants and the process used to resolve their con­
flict.101  And third, the allocation of public resources to the formali­
zation of disputes that could be settled informally starved the 
formal adjudication process of the resources needed to do what that 
process, ideally and alone, can do best: address and decide cases 
presenting challenges by individuals and communities to the power 
of corporations and centralized government institutions to control 
the production and distribution of social goods.102 
In the face of these formidable barriers standing between the 
world Illich saw (in most respects, still, the world we see as well) 
and his idealized conception of what law might accomplish, it is rea­
sonable to wonder why he remained even cautiously hopeful about 
the prospects for realizing his conception.  Part of the explanation 
for Illich’s persistent, if tenuous, optimism lay in his view of the 
relationship between adjudication and ideology. The ideological 
character of the law declared and enforced by judges was not lim­
ited to the particular doctrines that buttressed the social structures 
Illich criticized.  The content of the law in effect at any and all times 
was inescapably a function of ideology.103  But the inevitability of 
ideological bias in legal doctrine was also the very source of the 
dynamism and, hence, the malleability of that doctrine.  If the re­
sults of adjudication were ideological, what was needed, and possi­
bly achievable, was a different, more convivial, ideology.104 
For Illich, the conscious actions of three social groups could 
gradually usher in that ideology by generating the adoption of the 
legal principles needed to support the social change he sought.105 
99. Id. at 101. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 101-02. 
102. Id. at 102. 
103. Id. at 99. 
104. Id. at 99-100. 
105. Id. at 105-06. 
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The first of these groups was ordinary citizens insisting on judicial 
enforcement of their individual and collective rights against the 
domination of corporations, especially those rights which, though 
unrecognized, were nevertheless embedded in our legal tradi­
tions.106  The second and third were what Illich called “exceptional” 
lawyers and judges.107  The exceptional vocations each of these sets 
of legal actors could pursue were, however, quite different, reflect­
ing their different respective roles in the process of adjudication. 
An exceptional lawyer was one who tried to use litigation strategi­
cally to invert existing power relationships by arguing for the case-
by-case transformation of the doctrines that sustain these relation­
ships.108  Exceptional judges on the other hand, were not, and could 
not legitimately be, intentional partisans of legal or social 
change.109  Illich’s hope was that some (no doubt small) number of 
them would, through an abiding devotion to the formal ideals of 
adjudication—equal respect for all parties and for due procedure— 
transcend the corporate ideological commitments which would oth­
erwise shape their decisions.110  These few exceptional judges would 
be open to apprehend, appreciate, and sometimes become con­
vinced by the arguments presented to them by exceptional lawyers 
advancing the claims of committed citizens.111  They would also be 
attuned to critiques of the misuse of adversarial adjudication to pro­
cess conflicts that could and should be resolved informally, either 
by the disputants themselves or with the aid of non-adversarial me­
diation.112  Illich hoped that their receptivity to these critiques 
would prompt these “exceptional” judges to fashion more convivial 
institutions for the resolution of these ordinary disputes.113 
The efforts of committed citizens and “exceptional” profes­
sionals are no doubt thin reeds on which to build a movement for 
radical legal change.  Illich’s caution against high hopes for such 
change essentially concedes this point.  But, paraphrasing Margaret 
Mead, Illich might ask in response whether radical change has ever 
been achieved in any other way.114 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 106. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 106-07. 
111. See id. at 104-07. 
112. See id. at 101. 
113. Id. 
114. See Jone Johnson Lewis, Margaret Mead Quotes, ABOUT.COM, http:// 
womenshistory.about.com/cs/quotes/a/qu_margaretmead.htm (last visited May 24, 
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IV. ILLICH’S IMPACT ON THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
To be sure, Illich’s brief for the transformative potential of the 
rule of law is idealistic, perhaps touchingly so.  It depends on an 
explanation of the content of our past settled legal norms that he 
never directly provided.  It is possible that Illich’s reliance on the 
application of past law to “invert” present doctrine is illusory.  Our 
received legal norms may be so open-ended or internally contradic­
tory in content as to be vacuous.  As suggested by some critical le­
gal studies scholars a generation ago, adjudication may really be an 
empty, purely formal game, offering no grounds for justifying its 
results that are worthy of public trust.115  This skeptical view would 
be consistent with the malleability and inevitably ideological char­
acter of extant legal doctrine that Illich identified, but would rule 
out his argument’s deep respect for the wisdom conferred by tradi­
tion, and thus for the legitimacy he saw in change through law re­
form litigation.  Illich’s response to this critique would likely have 
rested on his conviction that the roots of a more convivial way of 
life than the one offered by modern industrial society are immanent 
in the values, including the legal values, of the past, and lie waiting 
to be unearthed and deployed by “exceptional,” reform-minded 
lawyers and open-minded judges.116  This optimistic conviction may 
be unwarranted, but it is one that has been shared by at least some 
lawyers who have fallen—some consciously, some not—under Il­
lich’s influence. 
One of these lawyers is a Waltham, Massachusetts, general 
practitioner named Eugene Burkart,117 who actually attended the 
Illich symposium.  Burkart first read Tools for Conviviality as an 
idealistic but alienated law student in the late 1970s.118  Illich’s cri­
tique of industrial society rang true to Burkart, and Illich’s hopes 
2012) (“Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change 
the world.  Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.”). 
115. See generally DUNCAN  KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF  ADJUDICATION (1997); 
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); ROBERTO MAN­
GABEIRA  UNGER, THE  CRITICAL  LEGAL  STUDIES  MOVEMENT (1986); Joseph William 
Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 10-14 
(1984); Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social 
Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 
509, 560-67 (1984). 
116. See ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY, supra note 43, at 106. 
117. Eugene J. Burkart, From the Economy to Friendship: My Years Studying 
Ivan Illich, in THE CHALLENGES OF IVAN ILLICH 156 (Lee Hoinacki & Carl Mitcham 
eds., 2002). 
118. Id. at 154. 
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for its inversion inspired him to see the practice of law as a poten­
tially transformative calling.119  In an essay recalling Illich’s influ­
ence on him, Burkart reports that his first step after reading 
“Tools” was to abandon law “schooling” for a more practically use­
ful legal education.  “The book was also helpful; it gave me the 
courage to skip most of my classes the last year of law school, so 
that I could work as much as possible in a legal aid office, learning 
the skills of a practicing attorney.”120  Burkart also drew on Illich’s 
celebration of immersion in a local, organic way of life over the 
impersonality of a commitment to personal advancement.  Burkart 
“wanted to know and be a part of the community where I worked; I 
wanted to be rooted in a place.”121 
At the same time, Tools for Conviviality offered Burkart a 
path to use his chosen work to address the injustices he saw in the 
established political order.  Thus, he “began the practice of law in 
the hopes that [he] could use law as an instrument for [radical] so­
cial change.”122  Burkart’s hopes were gradually chastened.  He de­
scribed his early life as a lawyer this way: 
Over the course of the next five years or so I was immersed in 
learning the ropes of a legal practice. The kind of law we did, 
general practice, put me in touch with the way law affects the 
lives of the great majority of people: through wills, divorce, crimi­
nal defense, disability claims, auto accidents, buying and selling 
homes, tenant and consumer cases.  While I received a lot of sat­
isfaction from seeing a good result achieved for individual clients, 
I began to be troubled by something:  A good result might bene­
fit someone in the short term, but I did not see it having any 
larger effect.  I saw that the ordinary practice of law did not work 
so much to make society more just but rather kept things as they 
were, and running smoothly.123 
Eventually, Burkart began to fear that Illich’s critique of the 
potentially baleful effects of professional expertise might apply to 
his own work.  “[S]ervice providers,” he observed, 
see people as being in need of their services. . . .  All of this is 
good for business[,] . . . [but] insidious since service systems take 
away from people what they could do on their own, . . . los[ing] 
. . . self-reliance and independence[.] . . .  After a while, I saw the 
119. See id. at 156. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 156-57. 
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joke.  When people asked me, “How’s work going?” I would an­
swer, “Never been better.  Families are falling apart, so there is 
plenty of divorce and juvenile delinquency; arrests are up . . . 
auto accidents and injuries at work are high . . . [b]usiness is 
good.”124 
Some years later, during Illich’s intermittent academic sojourns 
in the United States, Burkart and Illich became acquaintances, and 
eventually friends.125  By then (the 1980s), Burkart reports, Illich 
himself had concluded that legal work would not likely lead to fun­
damental social change.  For both Burkart and Illich, law only 
served as a “guide through the[ ] thicket[ ].”126  Law was still a con­
vivial tool, but one which could only help lawyers, clients, and com­
munities settle with, rather than transform, the alienation of 
modern industrial society.127 
If Eugene Burkart came to doubt the capacity of law and law­
yers to alter, or as Illich would put it, invert, existing social struc­
tures, there was another group of lawyers, roughly Burkart’s 
contemporaries, who based their professional identities on the 
transformative potential of law reform litigation. These lawyers 
were the staff attorneys of the legal services programs and the re­
gional and national support centers established by the White House 
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) between about 1964 and 
1974, when OEO was dismantled and legal services for the poor 
professionalized by Congress’s creation of the Legal Services Cor­
poration.128  These early Legal Services programs were inspired in 
part by the exemplary success of Charles Houston, Thurgood Mar­
shall, and their colleagues with the NAACP Legal Defense and Ed­
ucation Fund in urging a revised understanding of the Equal 
Protection Guarantee129 to prompt the Supreme Court to declare 
officially sanctioned racial segregation unconstitutional.130  The 
strategy of the litigation campaign against segregation was an appli­
124. Id. at 157-58. 
125. Id. at 157. 
126. Id. at 160. 
127. Id. at 156-57. 
128. JOHN A. DOOLEY & ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, LEGAL SERVICES HISTORY I.4, 
I.15, I.22 (1984). 
129. See Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590, 594 (Md. 1936); see also RICHARD 
KLUGER, SIMPLE  JUSTICE: THE  HISTORY OF Brown v. Board of Education and Black 
America’s Struggle for Equality 192-94 (Vintage Books 1977) (1975) (describing the 
litigation campaign to abolish de jure segregation). 
130. Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); see KLUGER, supra 
note 129, at 702-08. 
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524 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:507 
cation, long before he set it out in Tools for Conviviality, of Illich’s 
argument for the transformative potential of the inherent conserva­
tism of case-by-case adjudication.  Drawing on a venerable source 
of settled law, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Houston and Marshall famously argued that a proper 
application of that settled legal norm actually invalidated the very 
political and social practices that conventional legal and social 
thought had taken it to support.131  Through the gradual accretion 
of precedents achieved through carefully constructed lawsuits, they 
subjected an entrenched social institution first to re-evaluation, 
then to (formal, at least) dissolution.132  It was hard to imagine a 
more striking example of successfully applying established legal val­
ues to invert present legal doctrine. 
The Legal Services programs and support center lawyers strove 
to repeat Houston and Marshall’s strategy in the many areas of law 
which affected the lives of their impoverished clients.133  Their goals 
were ambitious.  They saw their task as blending the enforcement 
of previously unrecognized legal norms and the reform of estab­
lished legal doctrine to change the conditions under which poor 
people were obliged to live.134  Representing client groups such as 
farm workers, welfare recipients, tenants, students, and the elderly 
poor, legal services lawyers believed they could prompt judges to 
transform the legal rules governing landlord-tenant relations, public 
assistance programs, workplace conditions, and public schools for 
the benefit of their clients.135  For a time, they achieved some nota­
ble successes, especially in the areas of employment,136 housing,137 
and public benefits138 law.  But the accomplishments of this drive 
towards social reform through law reform litigation began to dwin­
131. Pearson, 182 A. at 590; see KLUGER, supra note 129, at 191-94. 
132. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495; Pearson, 182 A. at 594; see KLUGER, supra note 
129, at 186-94. 
133. See DOOLEY & HOUSEMAN, supra note 128, at I.13-15. (1984); see also SU­
SAN E. LAWRENCE, THE  POOR IN  COURT: THE  LEGAL  SERVICES  PROGRAM AND  SU­
PREME COURT DECISION MAKING 22, 30 (1990). 
134. LAWRENCE, supra note 133, at 22, 30. 
135. See id.; DOOLEY & HOUSEMAN, supra note 128, at I.15, I.22. 
136. See generally United Farm Workers Org. Comm. v. Monterey Cnty., 94 Cal. 
Rptr. 263 (Cal. 1971). 
137. See Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of City of Durham, 386 U.S. 670, 673-74 (1967); 
see also LAWRENCE, supra note 133, at 12 & n.30. 
138. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1968); see also 
MARTHA DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED 68, 80, 110-18 (1993). 
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dle by the mid 1970s,139 and the effort itself had ebbed considerably 
by the close of that decade.140  Still, the impetus to law reform con­
tinues to inform, at least in part, the identity and aspirations of 
many legal services lawyers.141  And the strategy of deploying tradi­
tional legal values to transform extant legal doctrine has been taken 
up by more contemporary cause-oriented lawyers, most notably in 
the women’s,142 disability rights,143 and gay, lesbian, and trans-
gender rights movements.144 
The law reform litigation effort shared (and still shares) Ivan 
Illich’s idealism about the possibility of fundamental social change 
and law’s role in bringing about this change.  In the early legal ser­
vices period, this idealism could be remarkably naı̈ve.  A personal 
anecdote offers a not atypical example of this naivete.´  As new law­
yers with a legal services support center focused on the rights of 
elderly poor clients, a colleague and I were charged with designing 
a strategy to reform the legal doctrines which governed the rights of 
workers governed by private pension plans. This was during the 
early 1970s, before the enactment of the Employee Retirement In­
come Security Act, which provides a measure of federal statutory 
regulation of these plans.  We saw our task as daunting, to be sure. 
But in our eyes, the path to success was completely clear. We 
would first write a law review article for the Clearinghouse Review, 
a specialized journal for legal services lawyers. The article, called 
Litigation as a Tool for Private Pension Reform,145 would show how 
long established values embedded in the common law, especially 
principles drawn from the law of trusts and contracts, could be 
deployed in new ways to revise then prevalent legal doctrine in 
ways that would assure more rights, and greater justice, for the re­
139. Harry P. Stump, Book Review, 1 LAW & POL. BOOK REV. 1, 25 (1990) (re­
viewing SUSAN E LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 
AND  SUPREME  COURT  DECISION  MAKING (1990)), available at http://www.bsos.umd. 
edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/lawrence.htm. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. See generally Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Weinberger v. 
Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); FAQs: The ACLU Women’s Rights Project and Wo­
men’s History Month, ACLU.ORG (Feb. 26, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/ 
faqs-aclu-womens-rights-project-and-womens-history-month. 
143. See generally CENTER  FOR  PUB. REPRESENTATION, http://www.centerfor 
publicrep.org/ (last visited May 24, 2012). 
144. See generally Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 
2003); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); GAY & LESBIAN  ADVOCATES & DE­
FENDERS, http://www.glad.org/ (last visited May 24, 2012). 
145. National Senior Citizens Law Center, Litigation as a Tool for Private Pen­
sion Reform, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 593 (1973). 
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526 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:507 
tirees we and other legal services lawyers would then represent in 
litigation.  We had no doubt that we would find the roots of con­
temporary justice in ancient principles of law.  It was simply a mat­
ter of digging them out, showing how they could be applied, and 
then filing lawsuits to apply them.  Houston and Marshall had 
shown the way in the desegregation struggle. We believed we could 
use their convivial tools in our very different arena of law reform. 
About six months after my colleague and I finished our article, 
we filed our first case.146  A month later, I read Illich’s account of 
law’s role in achieving social change in Tools for Conviviality.  I had 
no doubt that he was describing and endorsing our work, even if he 
seemed considerably more cautious about its prospects for success 
than we were. 
V. ILLICH’S ENDURING RELEVANCE 
Ivan Illich lived long enough to see the waning of the influence 
of his ideas and the apparent (though, of course, perhaps tempo­
rary) demise of the prospects for the sorts of basic change he hoped 
for.  Nonetheless, his ideas about the law and the relationship of 
litigation and social change provide a lens that can illuminate some 
developments in the culture of civil adjudication in the United 
States since his death. 
Significantly, Illich’s image of ideologically self-conscious law­
yers, whether “exceptional” or not, pursuing social change through 
law reform litigation continues to shape the identity of “cause ori­
ented” lawyers today as much as it did forty years ago.147  The ex­
tent to which the efforts of these lawyers have generated (or can 
generate) the fundamental change in social structures Illich sought 
is, of course, a matter of considerable dispute. The greatest suc­
cesses of law reform litigation have been the eradication of formal 
legal inequalities, first those based on race,148 then gender,149 and 
now sexual identity and orientation.150  Moreover, all of these suc­
cesses have been achieved largely through a straightforward appli­
cation of Illich’s mode of law reform through adjudication. 
Lawyers representing the civil rights, women’s, and LGBT move­
ments have each proceeded by urging the case-by-case application 
146. Ponce v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 628 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 
1980). 
147. See ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY, supra note 43, at 106. 
148. See Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
149. ACLU.ORG, supra note 142. 
150. GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS, supra note 144. 
32073-w
ne_34-2 S
heet N
o. 98 S
ide A
      08/21/2012   07:54:18
32073-wne_34-2 Sheet No. 98 Side A      08/21/2012   07:54:18
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-2\WNE209.txt unknown Seq: 21 20-AUG-12 15:22
 
2012] LAW AND ILLICH’S VISION OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 527 
of principles long embedded in our legal tradition (here the prohibi­
tion against unjust discrimination on the basis of ascribed status) to 
prompt first reconsideration, and eventually repudiation, of appar­
ently settled contemporary legal doctrine. 
In contrast to formal inequalities, more complex structural bar­
riers to social and political change have proven far more resistant to 
law reform litigation strategies.  Although championed convincingly 
by such scholar/litigators as Abram Chayes151 and Owen Fiss,152 the 
use of litigation to effect fundamental institutional reform has been 
only sporadically and, perhaps, temporarily successful.  Commenta­
tors such as Donald Horowitz and Gerald Rosenberg have argued, 
contrary to Illich, that adversarial litigation is ill-suited to and per­
haps incapable of contributing significantly to such reform.153 
On the other hand, Illich’s early identification of the distorted 
application of adversarial adjudication to conflicts which might be 
better resolved informally anticipated changes in American dispute 
resolution processes that are taken for granted today. The rise of 
the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) movement and the em­
brace of alternatives to litigation by judges, lawyers, institutional 
actors, and ordinary citizens has changed the legal landscape in 
ways Illich might well endorse, at least to a degree.  ADR has effec­
tively moved many of what Illich considered prosaic struggles over 
the distribution of the existing economic pie into more informal set­
tings that are seen as more accessible to the disputants, less costly, 
and less dependent on professional expertise than formal adjudica­
tion.  Many businesses have, with court approval, required their 
customers and employees to submit disputes, even those concerning 
rights protected by federal law, to resolution by arbitration rather 
than litigation.  Even federal courts have reoriented themselves, 
through both rules and changed cultural practices, toward heavy re­
liance on ADR and an expectation that nearly all civil cases will be 
resolved without trial.154  If anything, this de-emphasis on formal 
adjudication may have gone too far, perhaps depriving relatively 
powerless litigants of their only real opportunity to press serious 
151. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). 
152. See generally Owen M. Fiss, The New Procedure, 54 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 209 
(1985). 
153. See generally DONALD  HOROWITZ, THE  COURTS AND  SOCIAL  POLICY 
(1977); GERALD  ROSENBERG, THE  HOLLOW  HOPE: CAN  COURTS  BRING  ABOUT  SO­
CIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
154. Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution 
and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 225-28, 230-34 (1995). 
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528 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:507 
claims of right to a single decision-maker capable of giving them a 
fair hearing; the disinterested judge praised by Illich for his or her 
commitment to due procedure, equal respect for all parties, and 
openness to every substantive argument. The measured yet trench­
ant critiques of the ADR movement offered by such commentators 
as Judith Resnik,155 and again, Owen Fiss,156 are in any event based 
substantially on the same values Illich saw in the rigorous formalism 
of the judicial decision. 
But a more significant threat in our time to Illich’s hopes for 
the transformative potential of the rule of law may lie in the dimin­
ished stature of the ideal of disinterested adjudication.  Illich took 
for granted that the aspirations to procedural neutrality, equal 
treatment of all litigants, and openness to all substantive arguments 
were inherent in the institution of formal adjudication.  As a practi­
cal matter, though, he could not help but observe that these aspira­
tions were inevitably compromised, sometimes even corrupted, by 
the ideological commitments of judges.157  Still, for Illich, pursuit of 
the ideal virtues of adjudication nevertheless abided as a regulative 
ideal, adhered to faithfully by the “exceptional” judges, and as a 
matter of occasional necessity by the rest.158 
Illich’s faith in the enduring character of these virtues may, 
however, have been too optimistic.  For example, it is a truism, or 
nearly so, that appointments to the Supreme Court have for at least 
a generation been significantly influenced by the perceived ideolog­
ical commitments of those nominated to serve.  And though this 
influence is unquestionably bipartisan, its effects on the appoint­
ment process have been very different in Republican as compared 
to Democratic administrations.  Starting with President Reagan’s 
ultimately unsuccessful nomination of Robert Bork, Republican 
presidents have appeared usually to offer nominees they believed 
to be extremely conservative precisely because of their extreme 
conservatism, daring Democratic senators to oppose these nomi­
nees on ideological grounds.159  The one significant exception to 
this strategy, President George H.W. Bush’s nomination of Justice 
David Souter, prompted his son’s redoubled commitment to it, as 
155. See generally id. 
156. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); 
Fiss, supra note 152, at 210. 
157. ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY, supra note 43, at 102. 
158. Id. at 106. 
159. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS: A CONSTI­
TUTIONAL & HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, 58-60 (Duke University Press 2003). 
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evidenced by the appointment of Justice Samuel Alito and Chief 
Justice John Roberts.  Democratic presidents, on the other hand, 
faced with (or fearing) threatened ideological opposition from Re­
publican senators, have eschewed the appointment of obvious ideo­
logical liberals, offering instead nominees who either seemed 
politically centrist, had lower court judicial records that evinced 
moderation, or both. 
The result has been a Supreme Court which, especially since 
Justice O’Connor’s retirement in 2005, is deeply divided, yielding 
up one 5-4 decision after another, with the justices divided along 
predictably partisan lines.160  The division seems ideological, to be 
sure, but oddly so.  The ideologues appeared to be the five justices 
appointed by Republican presidents who constitute the Court’s 
usual majority in closely decided cases. The dissenters, now com­
prised of the four justices appointed by the last two Democratic 
presidents, have largely retained their pre-appointment reputations 
for moderation.  It is as if a pitched battle is underway over the 
content of American law, but only one side has taken up arms. 
This characterization of the diminished status of judicial disin­
terestedness on the current Supreme Court may be tendentious, 
based as it is on appearances.  Appearances can deceive, of course, 
and in any event are themselves hardly ideologically neutral.  Nev­
ertheless, on at least two notable occasions, the Court’s five justice 
Republican majority has issued decisions that overtly disavow Il­
lich’s prized virtues of equal treatment of parties, due procedure, 
and openness to all substantive arguments. The first and more no­
torious of these decisions was Bush v. Gore, in which the Court 
called a halt to the recount of popular votes in Florida,161 thereby 
securing the 2000 presidential election for George W. Bush. The 
Court’s decision to intervene in a closely contested presidential 
election was widely criticized as imprudent, especially in light of the 
procedures for political resolution of the dispute prescribed by the 
12th Amendment162 and the Electoral Count Act.163  And the plu­
rality opinion invalidating the Florida recount164 rested on a much 
160. Infra notes 161, 167; see, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 
2547, 2561 (2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744, 1756 
(2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); D.C. v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570 (2008); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701 
(2007). 
161. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000). 
162. U.S. CONST. amend. XII; Bush, 531 U.S. at 153-54. 
163. Electoral Count Act of 1887, 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-21 (2006); Bush, 531 U.S. at 154. 
164. Bush, 531 U.S. at 110. 
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more robust reading of the Equal Protection guarantee165 than any 
of its subscribers had previously suggested was applicable to state 
voting procedures.  But the infamous portion of the Bush v. Gore 
holding, for purposes of Illich’s model form of adjudication, was the 
plurality’s admonition that its ruling and the rationale offered to 
justify it were applicable only “to the present circumstances.”  Its 
authors would not regard the ruling as precedent in future cases 
that might otherwise be analogous, “for the problem of equal pro­
tection in election processes generally presents many complexi­
ties.”166  It is difficult to imagine a more direct or complete 
repudiation of the value of precedent, the obligation to treat simi­
larly situated litigants equally, and the stability and predictability of 
substantive law that inheres in its gradual accretion through case by 
case adjudication. Bush v. Gore is, in short, is by its own terms an 
openly lawless decision. 
The second, more recent abnegation of the rule of law by a five 
justice Republican Supreme Court majority is only slightly less bla­
tant than Bush v. Gore.  In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, decided in 2009, the 
Court changed the rules for the pleading of complaints filed by 
plaintiffs in civil cases in the federal district courts.167  Before Iqbal, 
all factual allegations asserted in civil complaints had long been en­
titled to a temporary presumption of truth for purposes of a defen­
dant’s challenge to their legal sufficiency. Chief Justice Roberts’s 
opinion for the court in Iqbal limited this presumption to only those 
factual allegations deemed “plausible” by the federal district judge 
considering the challenge.168  The plaintiffs in Iqbal were a class of 
immigrants from majority Arab and/or Muslim nations of origin 
who were taken into custody and detained indefinitely by American 
immigration authorities as part of Attorney General Ashcroft’s ef­
fort to prevent further terrorist acts in the immediate aftermath of 
the attacks of September 11, 2001.169  They argued that Ashcroft 
had unconstitutionally singled them out for arrest and investigative 
detention on the basis of their religion and/or national origin.170  In 
order for this claim to succeed, the Iqbal plaintiffs needed to prove 
(and thus to allege in their complaint) that the Attorney General’s 
policy was not only discriminatory in effect (not contested by the 
165. See id. at 103-11. 
166. Id. at 109. 
167. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 1943. 
170. Id. at 1944. 
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2012] LAW AND ILLICH’S VISION OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 531 
Iqbal defendants) but also that it was prompted, in part at least, by 
a prohibited discriminatory purpose.171  Of course, the plaintiffs 
made these necessary allegations.172  But under the new standards 
announced by Chief Justice Roberts, their assertion that the treat­
ment they suffered was influenced in any way by an improper dis­
criminatory purpose was deemed implausible and their claim was 
accordingly directed to be dismissed.173  For the Chief Justice, At­
torney General Ashcroft was motivated exclusively by his commit­
ment to forestall additional terrorist attacks on the United States in 
the wake of September 11.174  That motivation conclusively ruled 
out the “plausibility” of any contamination of his policy by discrimi­
natory animus. 
Chief Justice Roberts recognized that this new pleading stan­
dard required judges to make dispositive determinations of dis­
puted and controversial factual questions (in Iqbal whether a policy 
with an overwhelmingly disparate effect on an unpopular minority 
could have been infected by a discriminatory purpose) at the onset 
of litigation and without any discovery or formal consideration of 
evidence.175  How were judges to do this in a manner consistent 
with their formal obligations to openness, equal respect for liti­
gants, and due procedure?  For Roberts, the answer was to apply 
their “judicial experience and common sense[,]” formed by judicial 
experience.176  How this directive to rely on judicial common sense 
as the basis for refusing to examine the merit of claims presented by 
an injured party differs from an open invitation to indulge the ideo­
logical predilections so deplored by Illich remains unexplained.  In 
light of the Chief Justice’s application of the “plausibility” standard 
to the Iqbal claims themselves, perhaps this is because no explana­
tion is possible. 
The possibility of an epistemic distinction between law and 
politics, between applying and creating law, or as Illich would put it, 
between ideology and disinterest, has been under attack by legal 
philosophers for more than a century. Beginning with Justice 
Holmes, extending through the legal realists and on to their theo­
retical heirs in the critical legal studies movement, many thinkers 
have found this distinction impossible to sustain because of the in­
171. Id. at 1952. 
172. Id. at 1951. 
173. Id. at 1950-51. 
174. See id. at 1953. 
175. Id. at 1950. 
176. Id. 
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ability of judges to derive provably correct resolutions of competing 
legal arguments through a mechanical application of pre-existing le­
gal sources.177  The exercise of what Alexander Hamilton called 
“judgment” is inevitable.178  And distinguishing judgment from its 
philosophical opposite, will (or to put it slightly more gently, judi­
cial discretion) continues to pose a serious problem to the legiti­
macy of adjudication.179 
The problem has so far been largely a theoretical one, in the 
literal sense of that adjective, as most judges publicly practice their 
craft as though unaware of it, publishing opinions that relentlessly 
purport to rest on the application of pre-existing law to the case at 
hand.180  These judges may, of course, be philosophically naı̈ve. 
Perhaps more likely, they may be convinced that their practice rests 
on a fiction, albeit one which must be concealed in order to pre­
serve public faith in the ideal of a “government of laws not men.”181 
There is, however, a third possibility, one more congenial to Illich’s 
optimism about adjudication.  Perhaps it is the critique of the law/ 
politics distinction that is naı̈ve, resting as it does on the all too easy 
demonstration that there are not provably correct answers to con­
tested legal questions.  Perhaps the exercise of judgment to resolve 
these questions is not illusory, at least from the internal perspective 
of a judge who sees his or her responsibility as deciding particular 
cases through the application and interpretation of pre-existing 
sources of law.182  Such a judge may experience the disinterested­
ness so prized by Illich, even if he or she is also only too aware of 
the inevitable fallibility of all (legal) judgments. 
The philosophical critique of legal justification has until re­
cently been associated more with progressive or liberal than with 
conservative thought.  Justice Holmes, for all his hard bitten skepti­
cism about political and social reform, saw efforts to achieve it as 
inherent in self-government.183  The Realists were nearly all politi­
177. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 40-43 (2008). 
178. See id. at 157; THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clin­
ton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they 
should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would 
equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.”). 
179. POSNER, supra note 177, at 157. 
180. Id. at 40-43. 
181. Id. at 41 (citations omitted). 
182. See generally RONALD  DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR  HEDGEHOGS (The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University 2011); RONALD  DWORKIN, TAKING  RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY 
(Harvard University Press 1977). 
183. See Coppage v. Kansas, 35 S.Ct. 240, 248 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting), 
overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 61 S.Ct. 845 (1941); Adair v. 
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2012] LAW AND ILLICH’S VISION OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 533 
cal liberals, many affiliated with the New Deal.184  Critical Legal 
Studies was, without doubt, a movement of the political left.185  The 
contemporary defense of the law/politics distinction has been taken 
up largely by conservatives.186  Adherents to techniques of interpre­
tation such as discerning the plain meaning of legal texts and dis­
covering the intentions of the authors of these texts have claimed to 
solve the problem of judicial ideology by anchoring the grounds for 
judicial decision in sources outside the judge’s own values.187  Their 
claims have mostly been convincing only to audiences who approve 
of the results reached by judges who claim to follow these preferred 
techniques, perhaps because textualism and originalism, whatever 
their virtues, are no more capable of mechanical application to gen­
erate provably correct resolutions to legal questions than are any 
other, ostensibly less objective methods of decision. 
There are now signs, however, that the critique of the law/ 
politics distinction may be becoming more bipartisan. Richard Pos­
ner, a deservedly respected federal appellate judge, prolific author, 
and eminent conservative thinker, has recently published a book-
length argument against the possibility of the sort of judicial dis­
interest valued by Illich.188  Posner’s book claims both that argu­
ments from pre-existing legal sources cannot generate persuasive 
answers to contested legal questions, and that most judges know 
that this is so.189  Posner admits that judges (including him) nearly 
always present their opinions as applications of pre-existing law to 
the dispute in issue and not as impositions of their political will.190 
But this mode of presentation is no more than a disingenuous con­
vention made necessary by an unsophisticated public’s naı̈ve belief 
United States 208 U.S. 161, 190-92 (1908) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled in part by 
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 61 S. Ct. 845 (1941); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 
45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 83 S. 
Ct. 1028 (1963). See generally Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 
STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989). 
184. THE  OXFORD  COMPANION TO  AMERICAN  LAW 450 (Kermit L. Hall et al. 
eds. 2002). 
185. See Grey, supra note 183, at 813-14. See generally UNGER, THE  CRITICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT, supra note 115. 
186. See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING  TOWARD  GOMORRAH, 109-19 (1996); 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, 
9-19, 44-49 (Amy Gutmann ed. 1997). 
187. See Grey, supra note 183, at 794. 
188. See generally POSNER, supra note 177. 
189. See id. at 39-45; see also Eric J. Segall, The Court: A Talk with Judge Richard 
Posner, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Sep. 29, 2011), http://www.nybooks.com/ 
articles/archives/2011/sep/29/court-talk-judge-richard-posner/. 
190. See POSNER, supra note 177, at 39-45; see also Segall, supra note 189. 
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in the rule of law.191  Posner plainly subscribes to the more cynical 
of the possible explanations suggested above for the apparent obliv­
iousness of judges to the central threat to their professional legiti­
macy.  He, nevertheless, sees his book as a useful public service, 
exposing the emperor’s nakedness for all to see, while urging a sym­
pathetic understanding of, and acquiesce in, the pretense that he is 
clothed.192 
Posner believes that the legitimacy of adjudication will easily 
survive his revelation, since the public will be content to accept po­
litical decisions by judges, so long as these decisions are wise and 
show appropriate deference to the prerogatives of other major 
holders of political and economic power in our society.193  He may 
well be right.  Decisions such as Bush v. Gore,194 accepted instantly 
by the public (and defended by Posner himself) despite withering 
criticism from within the legal profession, and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,195 
are signs that he is right.  But if Posner is right, particularly if his 
claim that most judges see their role as he does is empirically accu­
rate, the premise of Illich’s hope for the transformative potential 
for law has disappeared.  Unless judges have reason to maintain an 
internal commitment to Illich’s virtues—due procedure, dispassion­
ate openness to all arguments, and equal respect for all parties, all 
that will remain is their ideology. 
CONCLUSION: NOTHING IS EVER PERMANENTLY SETTLED 
Ivan Illich invested hope in his ideal form of adjudication not 
only because he saw it as a convivial tool in itself, but also, equally 
importantly, because he believed that it meant that no issue of legal 
doctrine, and therefore, of social and political structure, could ever 
be permanently settled.  On this second point, the inherent mallea­
bility of American legal doctrine, there is ample evidence that Illich 
was accurate even if this malleability is not necessarily traceable to 
the gradual accretion of precedent Illich envisioned.  Consider the 
constitutional fate of the individual insurance purchase mandate 
contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act en­
acted by Congress, signed by the President in the spring of 2010.196 
191. See POSNER, supra note 177, at 89. 
192. See id. at 1-15. 
193. See Segall, supra note 189. 
194. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000). 
195. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). 
196. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010). 
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Prompted by a new social movement called the Tea Party,197 law­
suits were filed almost immediately to challenge the constitutional­
ity of the purchase mandate as beyond the enumerated power of 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce and to buttress such reg­
ulation with measures necessary and proper to its success.198  When 
this litigation was commenced, the conventional wisdom among al­
most all legal observers, scholars, commentators, and practition­
ers—in other words among nearly everyone with an informed 
opinion except for the lawyers who filed the suits and their clients— 
was that it was so meritless as to be nearly laughable.199  Commerce 
power doctrine which had been settled since the New Deal made 
clear that of course Congress could impose the insurance purchase 
mandate as part of a comprehensive measure to regulate the very 
substantial interstate market in health insurance.200 
By the fall of 2011, those federal courts which had considered 
the issue were divided on its constitutionality.201  A split between 
two federal appellate courts on the question202 prompted the Su­
preme Court to take it up during its 2011-12 term.  By the time the 
question was orally argued in March of 2012, it had become clear 
that a significant plurality, perhaps even a narrow majority, of the 
justices were sympathetic to the challenge to the individual 
purchase mandate.  These justices seemed poised to revisit, perhaps 
197. What is the Tea Party?, TEAPARTY.ORG, http://www.teaparty.org/about.php 
(last visited May 24, 2012). 
198. See Associated Press, 13 Attorneys General Sue Over Health Care Overhaul, 
USA TODAY (Mar. 23, 2010, 1:53 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-03­
23-attorneys-general-health-suit_N.htm; N.C. Aizenman & Amy Goldstein, Judge 
Strikes Down Entire New Health-Care Law, THE WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2011, 9:32 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/31/AR2011013103804. 
html; Josh Funk, AG Bruning Says Health Reform Violates Constitution, JOURNAL­
STAR.COM (Mar. 22, 2010, 12:42 PM), http://journalstar.com/news/local/govt-and-polit­
ics/article_cdf483b6-35c9-11df-a053-001cc4c03286.html. 
199. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious 
Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2011). 
200. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942). 
201. See Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
780 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1306 (N.D. Fla. 2011), reversed in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 
2011), cert granted, 132 S.Ct. 604 (2011); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F.Supp.2d 
611, 635 (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 671 F.3d 391, 397-98 (4th Cir. 2011); Thomas More 
Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F.Supp.2d 882, 895 (E.D. Mich. 2010), aff’d, 651 F.3d 529 (6th 
Cir. 2011). 
202. See Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1311. See generally Thomas 
More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 529. 
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reconsider, and maybe even revise some of that well settled New 
Deal era doctrine.203 
In the end, as we know, five justices were indeed prepared to 
hold the purchase mandate beyond Congress’s power to regulate 
interstate commerce.204  This view did not provide the basis for the 
Court’s decision, however, because one of the five, Chief Justice 
Roberts, saw the mandate as a federal tax authorized by Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution.205  His opinion, added to 
those of the four justices who viewed the mandate as within the 
commerce power, provided the fifth vote necessary to sustain its 
constitutionality.206 
We might wonder, of course, whether Illich would see the 
Court’s resolution of the Affordable Care Act litigation as an ex­
ample of the ideological approach to adjudication he deplored, or 
as reflective of the dispassionate process of open reevaluation of 
old questions that he prized.  For that matter, given his low regard 
for the medical services distribution system in general and the 
health insurance industry in particular, we might also wonder 
whether Illich would see the nearly successful challenge to the 
purchase mandate as an effort to entrench, or to invert, a distinctly 
unconvivial political and economic hierarchy. 
203. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398, 80 U.S. Law Week 
3553 (April 3, 2012). 
204. Nat’l Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, No. 11-393, 567 U.S. 
____, 2012 WL 2427810 (2012). 
205. Id., slip op. at 31. 
206. Id. 
